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Dutch Repatriation from the Former Third Reich and 
the Soviet Union: Political and Organizational 
Encounters and the Role of the  
Netherlands Red Cross 
Regina Grüter & Anne van Mourik ∗ 
Abstract: »Niederländische Repatriierung vom ehemaligen Dritten Reich und 
der Sowjetunion: Politische und organisatorische Zusammenstöße/ Begegnun-
gen und die Rolle des niederländischen Roten Kreuzes«. The repatriation of ap-
proximately 300,000 displaced Dutch persons from across Europe might seem 
rather straightforward compared to the problems regarding the mass displace-
ment of millions of Europeans as a result of the Second World War. However, 
poor planning due to controversies in the Dutch government in exile caused 
“structural errors” in the repatriation scheme itself. In addition, in the Nether-
lands, liberation and repatriation coincided while the population in the western 
part of the country needed immediate relief. Due to these circumstances, the 
repatriation of Dutch nationals was chaotic. The result was that the reputation 
of the Dutch government and the Netherlands Red Cross (NRC) was questioned 
by those repatriated and their communities. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
Dutch displaced persons (DPs) were brought home by the end of September 
1945, while an estimated 6,000 Dutch nationals were still in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. The repatriation of Dutch nationals held in the Soviet 
Union was particularly problematic as a result of the absence of a repatriation 
agreement with the Soviet Union and poor diplomatic relations, intensified by 
the advance of the Cold War. Eventually, by the mid-1950s, repatriation was 
considered complete. 
Keywords: Repatriation, World War II, Red Cross, displaced persons, Cold War, 
The Netherlands, Soviet Union.  
1. Introduction 
During the German occupation of the Netherlands, almost one million of the 
total population of less than nine million had fled their homes or had been 
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evacuated within the country’s borders. Moreover, an estimated 650,000 Dutch 
citizens were taken to the Third Reich, either as deported Jews (approximately 
107,000); deported Roma and Sinti (246); political prisoners (approximately 
29,000); prisoners of war (POWs; approximately 10,000); or forced laborers 
(approximately 500,000). Moreover, more than 20,000 men had joined the 
German military forces and were engaged in the struggle on the Eastern Front. 
In addition, 65,000 members of the Dutch National Socialist Party left the 
country in September 1944 when Allied forces approached the Dutch border. 
Although approximately 230,000 laborers returned during the occupation, and 
an estimated 30,000 national socialists returned before the general liberation, 
the fate of thousands of Dutch citizens was unknown when the war ended. 
Ultimately, the number of Dutch displaced persons (DPs) was approximately 
300,000 (Bossenbroek 2001, 105-7). They were scattered throughout the for-
mer Third Reich, from occupied Germany and liberated France and Belgium to 
countries in Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. The majority – 
more than 90% – were forced laborers (Lagrou 2000, 87-8). With the cessation 
of hostilities, the priority was to bring them all home.  
Within the broader picture of the refugee situation that emerged in Europe at 
the end of the war, Dutch DPs represent a small minority. Indeed, compared to 
the situation millions of Europeans faced after the collapse of the Third Reich, 
the position of the Dutch DPs was rather uncomplicated – most simply wanted 
to go home. However, this was in stark contrast with the millions of people 
who could not, or would not return home, and whose resettlement proved ex-
tremely problematic. Refugees fleeing new communist regimes and ethnic 
Germans expelled from Eastern European states and regions joined the already 
high numbers of DPs from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who resisted 
returning to their countries of origin. Many ended up in assembly centers and 
transition camps mainly in Germany and Austria – where some of them would 
remain for years – waiting or negotiating their resettlement in countries where 
often they were not particularly welcome.1  
However, this situation does not apply to repatriates returning to liberated 
countries further west. For example, France and Belgium had been liberated in 
1944 and thus had the opportunity to prepare for repatriation immediately after, 
if not even before, the German surrender. In addition, French and Belgian 
military forces collaborated with the Allied forces and were present in Germa-
ny – an advantage the Dutch did not share (Bossenbroek 2001, 109). As for the 
repatriation of Norwegian and Danish citizens, many former prisoners had been 
repatriated before the end of the war by the rescue operations organized by 
 
1  Gatrell (2013) sums up and analyzes the broad scope of mass displacement issues in Europe 
both during and after the war (89-117), and the specific displacement problems encoun-
tered by Jewish survivors and refugees (118-24). Proudfoot (1957, 201-3, 239) gives a gen-
eral oversight including (statistical) information on the Dutch repatriation. 
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Count Folke Bernadotte, the Vice-President of the Swedish Red Cross (Proud-
foot 1957, 308-9). The majority of the remaining Danish and Norwegian DPs 
in Germany and Eastern Europe had been repatriated by the end of June 1945 
(Danes) or the end of September 1945 (Norwegians; see Proudfoot 1957, 203-
4).  
This article focusses on the resettlement of Dutch DPs after the war, which 
was considered “unsystematic,” or “a structural error” by some Dutch officials 
shortly after the war (Bossenbroek 2001, 114, 143-5) and a failure by many 
repatriates and historians (de Jong 1988, 110-32; Lagrou 2000, 92, 96). The 
first subsection addresses the Dutch repatriation in general: the complicated 
planning of the repatriation by the government in exile; the ensuing chaotic 
preparation for the repatriation; the repatriation itself, including the role of the 
Netherlands Red Cross (NRC); and finally, the phase of tracing scattered Dutch 
citizens who remained in Eastern Europe after the general repatriation was 
concluded. The second subsection comprises a case study of the repatriation 
from the Soviet Union. This theme is of particular interest as it exemplifies the 
difficulties faced in the postwar period and how they were intensified by the 
onset of the Cold War. Although the Cold War influenced the situation for 
repatriates and DPs of other nationalities, the particular problems the Dutch 
faced were mainly caused by the failure to secure a repatriation agreement with 
the Soviet Union, and the ensuing diplomatic complications to which this over-
sight led. 
2. The Repatriation of Dutch DP’s: Plans, Preparations, 
and Practices 
The Dutch government in exile started planning for repatriation at an early 
stage. The first sign of awareness of the future need for repatriation was a con-
cept resolution signed by the Minister of Social Affairs, J. van den Tempel, on 
October 30, 1942. He was alerted by reports of the large numbers of forced 
laborers sent to Germany and advised the cabinet to appoint a commission to 
investigate the matter. Six months later, on May 1, 1943, the Hondelink com-
mission was installed. In June that year, the commission produced an interim 
report proposing that a military organization should carry out the repatriation, 
as the process would take place in collaboration with the Allied occupation 
forces in Germany. However, in a contradictory move, the final Hondelink 
report in February 1944 proposed that a civilian agency was to organize the 
repatriation, although “practical reasons” might call for a temporary military 
intervention. The report stated that preparations for the repatriation of 586,000 
people should be made and, in order to avoid any risk to Dutch public health, 
the border should be closed until the repatriates had undergone medical checks. 
Furthermore, quarantine measures were to be taken. No provisions were made 
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for the transportation of the sick, or for providing food and clothing to the 
hundreds of thousands of Dutch people outside the country – this task instead 
being left to international aid organizations (Beening 2002, 28-9). 
The adjustments in the final Hondelink report were recommended by Van 
den Tempel. They reflect a controversy that had developed within the Dutch 
government concerning the nature of the repatriation scheme. The issue was 
whether the repatriation should be a military or a civilian operation. Van den 
Tempel, a social democrat, was in favor of a civilian agency conducting the 
operation, not least as he had ambitions for the role of the social democrats in 
the economic and social reconstruction of Dutch society after the war, and thus 
insisted that his ministry would carry out the repatriation (Beening 2002, 23-7). 
In preparation for the phase immediately after the liberation, the government 
founded the Military Authority in order to take over administrative responsibil-
ity in the Netherlands in the period between the liberation and the return of the 
government. Van den Tempel’s opponents in the cabinet were in favor of the 
Military Authority to carry out the repatriation. It would only focus on the 
situation in the Netherlands itself. The assumption was that most Dutch citizens 
would return of their own accord or with the help of the Allies (Beening 2002, 
28-30).  
What was the effect of these opposing opinions and the ensuing political 
controversy within the government on the preparations for the repatriation? 
Based on recommendations in an interim report dated October 1943, Van den 
Tempel appointed G. F. Ferwerda, a former director of the Unilever Company, 
as head of the Repatriation Commission. On January 6, 1944, Ferwerda pre-
sented his plans. He estimated the number of repatriates to be 615,000. The 
ambition was to employ 6,700 members of staff and bring the Dutch repatriates 
home within three months after the liberation. A rigid bureaucratic registration 
system was part of the scheme, however, it did not include collaboration with 
Allied military forces in occupied Germany (Beening 2002, 30-3). While 
Ferwerda was working out his plans, the chief of the Military Authority, Major 
(later General) H. J. Kruls, presented his plan in December 1943. The plan 
assumed that between 200,000 and 700,000 people would return of their own 
accord in an unorganized repatriation. These repatriates would be collected in 
small reception centers on the Dutch side of the border, then led to larger cen-
ters for registration and medical checks, and then further on to hospitals, quar-
antine camps, or home (Bossenbroek 2001, 88). Thus, Dutch arrangements for 
repatriation resulted in two separate agencies without any systems in place for 
their collaboration: Ferwerda’s civilian agency coordinating repatriation activi-
ties in the former Third Reich; and Kruls’s military organization, operating 
within the Dutch borders.  
On November 9, 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin-
istration (UNRRA) was founded in Washington. Its G-5 (Civil Affairs) Divi-
sion would take responsibility for DPs and refugees. The Netherlands was one 
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of the 44 nations that signed the agreement. Furthermore, in May 1944, the 
Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War signed the “Civil Affairs Agree-
ment” with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). 
This meant that the Allied commander-in-chief of SHAEF was in charge of the 
civilian administration in the Netherlands during the military phase of the 
country’s liberation. The Military Authority under Kruls’s leadership was to 
collaborate with SHAEF. The Minister of War signed a second agreement with 
SHAEF in September 1944, passing the ultimate responsibility for refugees 
within the Dutch borders and DPs outside the Netherlands to SHAEF. SHAEF 
could delegate these tasks either to UNRRA or to the Dutch government in 
exile, who were to work according to SHAEF’s procedures. For this purpose, 
special liaison officers would be posted with the Allied forces in Germany. 
However, a formal resolution by the Dutch government, also signed in Sep-
tember 1944, agreed with Van den Tempel’s policy: the repatriation was to be 
carried out under the Minister of Social Affairs and the Minister of the Interior. 
This resolution did not include collaboration with SHAEF or UNRRA. By this 
time, Kruls had appointed liaison officers in the Military Authority. The result 
of the resolutions with the Allied agencies and the two Dutch repatriation 
schemes was organizational chaos. The military effort was confined to Dutch 
territory, while Ferwerda’s Repatriation Service, which was to collaborate with 
the Allied forces in the former Third Reich, was set up as a civilian agency. 
The deadlock between the two competing Dutch views on repatriation was 
“solved” by a compromise: Kruls’s liaison officers were appointed as repatria-
tion officials in Ferwerda’s Repatriation Service (albeit without military status) 
and SHAEF was willing to accept civilian repatriation officials despite their 
non-military status (Bossenbroek 2001, 90-5).  
At the commencement of the liberation of the southern part of the Nether-
lands in September 1944, the Military Authority started its repatriation activi-
ties directed by B. G. van Os van Delden. For the time being, he was stationed 
in Brussels. Ferwerda was not yet permitted to cross the English Channel be-
cause of his civilian status. He had to direct the repatriation of large numbers of 
Dutch DPs from liberated France and Belgium from London. By April 1945, he 
was still not properly equipped: he had four small trucks and two motor bikes 
at his disposal, and no ambulances. In May, Ferwerda’s repatriation officials – 
the initial number of 6,700 was reduced to 60 – were still hardly able to carry 
out their assignment. They did not have military status, and depended entirely 
on the willingness of Allied military staff to help out. SHAEF questioned their 
competence, as the Dutch officials lacked equipment, means of transportation, 
and adequate communication lines with Ferwerda’s office (Bossenbroek 2001, 
90-5, 100-1, 109). By the end of May, the government decided to concentrate 
all repatriation activities – both inside and outside the Dutch border – under 
Van Os van Delden’s responsibility, and to dismiss Ferwerda. However, 
Ferwerda successfully challenged his dismissal, although his activities were 
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confined to areas in which SHAEF was not operational. Van Os van Delden 
took over repatriation activities in Germany and, with the consent of SHAEF, 
the repatriation officers were finally given military status (Bossenbroek 2001, 
136-7). 
2.1  The Repatriation of Dutch Citizens 
The course of the liberation complicated matters considerably. While the 
southern part of the country was liberated, the northern part was still occupied. 
In particular, people in the western provinces yearned for liberation. On May 5, 
1945, three days before the German capitulation, these areas were finally liber-
ated. By this time, the Nazi camps had been liberated and France and Belgium 
had already taken up relief and repatriation activities. For the Dutch, liberation 
and repatriation coincided. However, Nazi atrocities in the remaining occupied 
part of the country increased considerably, and hunger and starvation struck the 
population. Chaos ensued, with general destruction, military inundations of 
areas near the frontlines, and increasing numbers of refugees and people roam-
ing the countryside in search of food bringing Dutch society to a standstill. 
Hundreds of thousands of people required immediate medical aid and food 
(Hitchcock 2008, 98-129).  
This situation had three practical effects on the repatriation process. First, 
the coinciding of liberation and repatriation meant that there was hardly any 
capacity to bring Dutch nationals home immediately after the German surren-
der. There had been plenty of time for planning (and arguing about) the repatri-
ation, but there had been little time for practical preparations. Second, because 
of the destruction and chaos, Kruls had advised the Dutch government in exile 
and SHAEF to close the borders to repatriates until the situation had improved. 
The result was that early Dutch repatriates were confined to collection centers 
in France, Belgium, and border cities in the Netherlands until June 1, 1945, 
when transport to the western part of the country was once again permitted. 
Finally, there was a less conspicuous effect: the Military Authority, as well as 
the international and national relief agencies in the Netherlands, focused on the 
immediate needs in the country itself. Between September 1944 and the general 
liberation in May, the Military Authority, SHAEF, and international relief 
agencies in the liberated south joined their efforts to prepare emergency relief 
for the western part of the country (Grüter 2017, 261-4). The core focus was to 
address the hardship of the population there, while the needs of DPs seemed 
less acute. In addition, as stated above, one of the early considerations of the 
Military Authority was the “unorganized repatriation” from the former Third 
Reich. This focus caused a backlog in both practical preparations and the repat-
riation itself. While the liberation of France and Belgium before the end of 
1944 enabled early preparations for the repatriation of their citizens, the Dutch 
lagged behind due to the poor condition the country faced after the late general 
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liberation and their dependency upon the Allied agencies. Moreover, the main 
focus of the Allies was to defeat the German forces, not to care for the DPs or 
to arrange their repatriation (Lagrou 2000, 99-103; Bossenbroek 2001, 109-10).  
However, many forced laborers had already taken their chances during the 
increasing chaos and destruction in Germany and had crossed the eastern Dutch 
border before the end of the war. Red Cross branches and aid committees set 
up by the local population took care of them. The sick were taken to Red Cross 
emergency hospitals, while others tried to reach their homes with false identifi-
cation documents provided by members of the underground resistance (Grüter 
2017, 241-2). Despite this, most repatriates had to wait until the liberation of 
the Netherlands in May 1945 and many Dutch camp survivors saw their fellow 
survivors from other countries being repatriated, while they had to wait for aid 
and transportation. In some cases, French, Belgian, and Polish officials ap-
peared in the liberated camps weeks before Dutch repatriation officials – if they 
ever came at all. As a result, frustrated and critical articles written by early 
repatriates or family members of those who had not yet returned began to ap-
pear in Dutch newspapers. Besides the main reproach – the failure to send 
parcels to Dutch internees during the war – another harsh criticism was that 
men and women who could have survived if only they had been repatriated in 
time, had died in the liberated camps due to lack of timely aid.2 However, the 
Dutch historian Martin Bossenbroek (2001) suggests that making a causal link 
between late Dutch repatriation activities and the death of Dutch concentration 
camp prisoners after the liberation is too simplistic. At Bergen Belsen, for 
example, many survivors died because of the rich food given to them after 
British forces liberated the camp, while in other examples, such as Buchenwald 
and Dachau, the condition of 40 and 70 survivors respectively was so poor that 
it was impossible to transport them. A number of these survivors succumbed 
while receiving medical care in the liberated camps (Bossenbroek 2001, 112-
4).  
Despite these complex circumstances, according to Proudfoot (1957), 
SHAEF managed to repatriate over 325,000 DPs claiming to be Dutch nation-
als between May and the end of September 1945, leaving only 5,902 Dutch 
nationals still in need of repatriation. At the same time, an estimated 30,000 
survivors returned of their own accord (Proudfoot 1957, 201-3, 239). They 
returned on foot, with “borrowed” bicycles, or by hitching rides on freight 
trains. Additionally, the International Red Cross, national Red Cross societies, 
and the consulates of other nationalities also assisted Dutch DPs. Ronnie Gold-
stein-van Cleef (2006) provides an account of her own repatriation that is ex-
emplary of the problems many DPs encountered. She and her fellow Jewish 
survivors of the Libau labor camp reached Prague of their own accord and with 
 
2  For example, Koos Vorrink and Ed Hoornik, former political prisoners (see Bossenbroek 2001, 
66-8, 107). 
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help of individuals. In Prague, a Czech partisan took them to a relief center, 
however, their stay was only temporary. As they roamed the city, looking for 
food and shelter, they met two former Dutch POWs, who told them they would 
soon be picked up by a Dutch repatriation delegation. However, Dutch repatria-
tion officials did not appear, nor did the NRC. The Swedish and Belgian consu-
lates provided them with identification documents and organized a train to 
Pilsen, where the Russians handed them over to the Americans. After spending 
several nights at the train station, American Army trucks picked them up and 
transported them to Bamberg. Another week of waiting ended with their trans-
portation on a freight train to the Netherlands. When the train finally arrived at 
the station in Maastricht, their frustrations came to a head when Red Cross 
volunteers handed out coffee to the repatriates on the train. As if they had 
agreed upon this beforehand, they simultaneously grabbed the cups and threw 
the coffee into the faces of the Red Cross women. “This was our sweet re-
venge. You must understand that we returned wild, without sense of norms and 
reality,” Ronnie stated in a lecture for a delegation of the NRC board on Sep-
tember 19, 2005.3 Their feelings of abandonment were focused on the NRC, as 
was the case for many survivors. Their expectations had been that at least the 
NRC would come to their aid.  
2.2  The NRC’s Role in the Repatriation 
So, what was the role of the NRC? Its ambitions were the consequence of the 
humanitarian role of the organization. Two years into the occupation – towards 
the end of 1942, when the deportation of the Jewish population had been going 
on for five months – the Secretary General of the NRC, H. K. Offerhaus, be-
came aware of the need for a future repatriation mission. He took a striking and 
entirely private initiative and requested his family doctor, A. Polak Daniëls, to 
prepare for a relief expedition to the Dutch Jews, which was to be sent to the 
east as soon as the Nazis were defeated. Dr. Daniëls sent a letter to the Dutch 
envoy in Switzerland, requesting him to forward the letter to the government in 
exile in London. Offerhaus also set up a committee that secretly prepared a 
scheme for the repatriation of all Dutch citizens being held in the Third Reich. 
Contacts in the underground sent the plans to London. In the early months of 
1945, also in strict secrecy, the board of the NRC made further plans for the 
repatriation. The plans focused mainly on the reception of repatriates and in-
cluded setting up emergency hospitals, reception camps, and quarantine facili-
ties. Yet despite their efforts, neither the NRC committee nor Polak Daniëls 
received a reply, and it was not until after the liberation that it became clear 
that the Dutch government had not been interested in the plans drawn up by the 
NRC. Days before the general liberation, representatives of the government 
 
3  An abridged version of the lecture was published in the Auschwitz Bulletin (2006). 
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appointed a new board (Grüter 2017, 386-7). This new board had to deal with 
the reality that neither the government nor the Allied agencies had involved the 
NRC in their plans. It took some time and pressure by the NRC and former 
resistance workers to finally realize NRC participation (Grüter 2017, 305-6, 
414-6).  
Generally speaking, the NRC became involved in three areas. First, its activ-
ities during the occupation and its preparation for the reception of repatriates 
during the final months of the war evolved into giving aid in emergency hospi-
tals and reception camps on the Dutch-German border. In addition, local NRC 
branches sent several ambulance teams to Germany, however, they were not 
registered with either the Military Authority or SHAEF. Despite this, with the 
consent of the Military Authority, the NRC set up a “Red Cross Camp” in the 
former Polizeiliches Durchgangslager Amersfoort (Police Transit Camp 
Amersfoort), mainly for returning forced laborers. This was a natural develop-
ment, as the German camp commander had handed over the camp to the NRC 
when Canadian troops approached. NRC volunteers and staff also worked in 
other reception camps in the border regions. When the official repatriation was 
still in a state of deadlock immediately after the liberation, several individuals 
appealed to the NRC to fetch survivors from Buchenwald and Dachau. The 
NRC sent twelve ambulances to repatriate those survivors whose medical con-
dition allowed transportation (Bossenbroek 2001, 412).  
The second area in which the NRC participated was in the repatriation from 
Germany – the assignment given to Van Os van Delden by the Military Au-
thority. NRC assistance with his repatriation scheme was entirely initiated by 
members of the new board. They had close contacts with the Grote Ad-
viescommissie der Illegaliteit (GAC; Dutch National Resistance Council). 
Dissatisfaction about the progress of the repatriation had spread across the 
country, and both returned survivors and the families of missing political pris-
oners were highly critical of the government and the NRC. In a letter to the 
Military Authority, the board stated that it regretted that it was not involved in 
the repatriation scheme and offered its assistance.4 No reply came, however, 
following some pressure, Van Os van Delden decided to accept the offer. The 
next step was a formal agreement with the Allied authorities. On July 14, 1945, 
Van Os van Delden and a joint NRC-GAC delegation met in Frankfurt and 
signed an agreement with officials of UNRRA, which by this time had taken 
over repatriation activities from SHAEF. The NRC was the only private Dutch 
organization permitted to work in Germany and was now permitted to transport 
sick repatriates, and send tracing teams to Germany and Austria. The agree-
ment enabled the NRC to set up offices in the Soviet zone in Berlin, Hamburg, 
Burgsteinfurt, Iserlohn, and Vienna, from where it sent tracing teams to the 
 
4  Letter by NRC board to the Military Agency, May 21, 1945, 2.05.87/1230, National Archives, 
The Hague. 
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surrounding areas. These teams remained active until April 1949 (Beening 
2002, 55; Grüter 2017, 421).  
The third area of activity concerned the NRC’s participation in Ferwerda’s 
scheme – now confined to non-enemy countries. After Ferwerda had moved his 
office to The Hague, he assigned the task of transporting sick repatriates back 
to the Netherlands to the NRC. The board sent doctors and ambulance teams to 
Belgium and France, while NRC delegates visited the Scandinavian countries 
and repatriated Dutch citizens from Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and Den-
mark.5 The NRC also participated in a mission to Prague, led by G. A. Boon, a 
lawyer and former member of parliament. It located a total of 1,300 survivors 
from the Theresienstadt concentration camp in the cities of Bamberg, Pilsen, 
and Prague, and organized their return by train. In total, 675 children, sick, and 
elderly people were flown to the city of Eindhoven in the south of the Nether-
lands by the American Air Force. Boon and his staff remained active during the 
following months, roaming Central and Eastern Europe in search of people 
who had stayed behind. They managed to repatriate another 500 people 
(Bossenbroek 2001, 124-5). 
Another mission was led by Dr. W. J. A. Willems, who had been a press of-
ficer at the Dutch delegation in Stockholm during the final phase of the war. He 
set up a Swedish-Dutch repatriation mission stationed in Warsaw from No-
vember 1945, which remained active for three years. At the suggestion of the 
Polish Red Cross, Willems was appointed an NRC delegate. This was of vital 
importance for the success of the mission, as it helped to avoid political prob-
lems and to secure the assistance of the Polish Red Cross (Leenders 1988, 36-8, 
58). The ultimate result was the repatriation of 400 to 450 people, most of 
whom were considered “difficult cases” by the Dutch government: former 
forced laborers who had ended up in Eastern Europe; men who had volunteered 
in the German forces; and men who had married a German or Polish wife 
(Leenders 1988, 60; Bossenbroek 2001, 124).  
Despite the ambitions of the NRC, it became clear that it was not prepared 
for this task and they received many complaints, such as those noted by Van Os 
van Delden. He had joined an NRC team on their journey to the French zone in 
August, and sent a long list of shortcomings to the NRC board: the departure 
was poorly organized; he personally had to pay for fuel; the identification doc-
uments were not in order; the uniforms and insignia of the team members were 
diverse; and their footwear was inadequate. The team resembled a “FFI [Forces 
Françaises de l’Intérieur; French resistance in the later stages of the war] team 
of bandits.”6 An inspection mission conducted by the NRC and the GAC three 
 
5  Heusdens (n.d., 341-2, 347); list of NRC ambulance teams active in 1945, with destinations, 
dates, numbers of vehicles, and numbers of patients (Heusdens n.d. 347).  
6  Letter from Van Os van Delden to NRC Secretary General, August 14, 1945, 184/64, NIOD, 
Amsterdam. 
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months later still noted shortcomings, which were confirmed by team members 
themselves. One of them wrote that he felt the team resembled “a run-down 
bunch of beggars.”7 However, not all shortcomings can be attributed to the 
NRC: the organization and communication by UNRRA and the British Search 
Bureau were chaotic, although the resultant necessary improvisation sometimes 
yielded good results (Wijnen 1967, 6-10; Grüter 2017, 422-3).  
2.3  Dutch Endeavors Tracing Missing Persons 
By the time Boon’s mission had started, the Dutch government considered the 
“mass repatriation” closed. Most surviving Dutch citizens had returned, and 
only a small number of people remained scattered in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Ferwerda’s Repatriation Service was closed down in October 
1945 and a special Repatriation Unit in the Ministry of Social Affairs took over 
the remaining work. Its task was to trace and repatriate any remaining Dutch 
DPs and to collect information on the fate of missing persons and the burial 
locations of the deceased. 
The Information Bureau of the NRC played a key role collecting and as-
sessing this information. The bureau had been activated when the war started in 
1939, on the basis of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Its main assignment was to 
collect information concerning the fate and whereabouts of soldiers and POWs 
of all nationalities on Dutch territory. During the occupation, it expanded its 
work for the benefit of civilians. To this end, it established the Correspondence 
Bureau and other sections to enable the exchange of Red Cross messages with 
family and friends outside the Netherlands, and the Dutch East Indies in partic-
ular (Grüter 2017, 88).  
The main assignment of the Information Bureau after the liberation was to 
discover the fate of the missing and to provide this information to next of kin 
and government agencies. This meant a great expansion of its work, which was 
financed by the Ministry of Social Affairs.8 In September 1945, it became the 
National Tracing Service. In this capacity it received the exclusive right – as far 
as Dutch victims and survivors were concerned – to collaborate with the Cen-
tral Tracing Bureau (later the International Tracing Service in Bad Arolsen) 
and UNRRA, and from 1947 onward also with the International Refugee Or-
ganization. The NRC missions worked closely with the Information Bureau, 
 
7  Letters by team member W. Cornelis, October 1945, 244/1702, NIOD, Amsterdam; Report on 
tour along NRC medical teams in Northern Germany, November 1945, 184/6, NIOD, Amster-
dam.  
8  Statistics demonstrate the significance and workload of the bureau: incoming mail reached 
a peak in September 1945, when it received 27,209 postal items in a single week. In May 
and June 1946, the staff numbered 396 employees. By the end of 1947, the number had 
dropped to 174 (see van der Vosse 1948, 106, 228). 
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exchanging documents and other information they uncovered regarding the fate 
of the missing (Grüter 2017, 420-1, 424-8). 
Despite the work of the NRC and the good intentions of the other parties in-
volved, many problems arose. The Ministry of Social Affairs questioned the 
competence of the NRC and criticized it for its poor organization and disap-
pointing results. In July 1947, the Ministry of Social Affairs decided to estab-
lish a special tracing mission – the so-called “Missie tot Opsporing van ver-
miste personen uit de bezettingstijd” (MtO; mission tracing persons who had 
gone missing during the occupation) – under its own supervision. The Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance were involved, as were representa-
tives of the NRC, the Information Bureau, and the Association of Ex-Political 
Prisoners. This decision resulted in a huge conflict between the NRC board and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. Although initially the NRC had supported the 
reorganization, they disagreed with the division of the new roles, believing that 
the responsibility for the detection of missing persons should have been dele-
gated to them. According to the NRC, it was the most suitable agency to gather 
information because of its cooperation with the international network of the 
Red Cross. The NRC board also accused the Ministry of Social Affairs of lack-
ing a sense of reality about the poor working conditions the NRC staff had to 
cope with in the occupied zones, as they lacked proper means of transportation 
and office equipment. Their work was further impeded by having to comply 
with the rules of the Allied authorities, and budget cuts by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. To prove their point, the NRC board wrote up a report with 
forty annexes about the complicated work of the NRC and Information Bureau 
and the good results it had yet achieved. The impasse ended following a written 
report from an impartial lawyer appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
which stated that its objections to the NRC were justified. The NRC formally 
ended its participation in the MtO in April 1948.9  
Despite the criticisms of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Information Bu-
reau played a key role in establishing the fate of those who had not returned.10 
It also assisted a special committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice to 
provide death certificates for those who remained missing. This committee was 
appointed after special legislation was passed in 1949. The Dutch government 
aimed to establish the date and location of death – something that required a 
major commitment from the Information Bureau staff. Those who remained 
 
9  NRC Report, May 10, 1948, General Documentation 35/2, Archive NRC, The Hague; G. W. ter 
Pelkwijk, Report: “Moeilijkheden bij de Reorganisatie van de Opsporing van Vermisten in 
Duitsland,” “Opsporingswerkzaamheden” [Tracing activities], box 9, Archive NRC, The Hague. 
10  By the end of 1953, the Information Bureau had registered approximately 160,000 deaths 
of Dutch citizens due to the war in Europe, of whom more than 100,000 were Jewish. The 
fate of 16,360 people remained unclear (van de Vosse 1954, 95-6). 
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missing were pronounced dead and were officially included in the official 
Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (van der Vosse 1954, 72-3, 85).  
Over subsequent decades, the Information Bureau continued its work, albeit 
on a much smaller scale. In particular, the fate of missing Dutch citizens in the 
Soviet Union remained unclear. The DPs who ended up there during the war 
and its chaotic aftermath became victims of the Cold War. This issue stands out 
in the history of Dutch repatriation because of the specific political problems 
that arose between the Dutch government and the Soviet authorities, as ex-
plored in the proceeding subsection.  
3.  Bilateral Repatriation between the Netherlands and 
the Soviet Union 
Negotiations between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union over the repatria-
tion of their citizens were extremely problematic. Stalin wanted the two million 
Russians living in the western occupation zones sent back to the Soviet Union 
– even if that meant they were to be repatriated against their will. This con-
cerned not only POWs and forced laborers, but also Russian women who had 
married DPs from the West, and Russian soldiers and prisoners who had volun-
tarily joined the German forces. Their presence in the capitalist West was, in 
Stalin’s view, an ideological blot that had to be erased as quickly as possible. 
These displaced Russian citizens had to return, either to face punishment or, if 
they were lucky, to be brought back in line with communist ideology. To 
achieve his goal, Stalin used the Dutch DPs held within the Russian sphere of 
influence as commodities with which to barter (Bossenbroek 2001, 119). How-
ever, the Dutch government refused to give in to this demand, causing a politi-
cal tug of war with the Soviet Union over bilateral repatriation. How did the 
Dutch government deal with this issue and what did this mean for Dutch citi-
zens in the Soviet Union and Soviet zone? 
3.1  Displaced Dutch Citizens in the Soviet Union and Soviet Zone 
During the early phase of planning the repatriation, the government in exile 
was concerned about the fate of Dutch citizens who had ended up in the Soviet 
Union. In September 1943, the Dutch ambassador, Casper van Breugel Doug-
las, arrived in Moscow and attempted to reach an agreement with the Soviet 
Union on the issue of repatriation. In the beginning of 1944, he requested per-
mission for a collaborative Red Cross and repatriation mission on Russian 
territory. His goal for this mission was to find out the number of Dutch civil-
ians living on Russian soil, and to uncover how many of them had collaborated 
with the Germans. The Russian authorities replied three months later, inform-
ing him that there were only 15 Dutch citizens on their territories. This was an 
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enormous difference compared with the 20,000 to 30,000 the ambassador ex-
pected to find (Postma 2003, 170). 
The exact number of Dutch DPs in the Soviet Union and Soviet zone re-
mained unclear after the liberation. Until mid-1948, the Dutch government 
suspected that approximately 1,600-1,700 Dutch nationals were living behind 
Soviet lines. These estimations were based on information provided by the 
Information Bureau. After three years of investigation, this number was adjust-
ed, and set at closer to 250. However, according to rumors, thousands of Dutch 
people were held in secret. By the next year, in 1950, the estimated number of 
Dutch nationals remaining in the Soviet Union and the Soviet zone had grown 
closer to 400 (de Groot 2007, 24).  
We can divide the Dutch people who were being held in the Soviet Union 
into four groups: members of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (NSB; 
National Socialist Party); Jews, who had been deported to Eastern Europe; 
forced laborers; and men who joined the Waffen-SS. Among these, Waffen-SS 
members were also men who became POWs with the Red Army, at the end of 
April 1945. In April 1944, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Van den 
Tempel, believed that the Soviet government would look favorably upon the 
early departure of displaced Dutch citizens, because it meant that Moscow 
would no longer be responsible for their welfare. As such, the large number of 
Dutch people being held in the Soviet Union was reason enough to sign a repat-
riation agreement. However, by the end of 1944, departures had still not begun 
and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, was in no 
hurry to discuss a repatriation agreement. 
3.2  Dutch Failure to Achieve a Repatriation Agreement with the 
Soviet Union 
Why did Molotov not respond to the efforts of the Dutch ambassador to reach 
an agreement? Bossenbroek (2001) summarizes the more commonly stated 
reasons for the failure of reaching an agreement: Russia’s dissatisfaction with 
the Netherlands over their late recognition of the Soviet regime (1942); Dutch 
colonial presence in the Indonesian archipelago; the absence of communists in 
the Dutch government; and the relatively large number of Dutchmen who had 
joined the Waffen-SS. In addition, he states that, according to popular litera-
ture, the absence of a repatriation agreement and inactive diplomacy between 
the Dutch and the Russian governments meant that there were no, or only very 
late, Dutch repatriation missions in the Soviet Union and Soviet zone 
(Bossenbroek 2001, 119). 
However, Bossenbroek (2001) argues that the Soviet Union had a more op-
portunistic reason for neglecting the Dutch attempts to reach a repatriation 
agreement: the Soviet Union did not need a separate agreement with the Neth-
erlands, because the country was under Allied control during this period. As 
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stated above, Dutch and Allied authorities had agreed that the Netherlands 
would remain under Allied control – administered by SHAEF and the Military 
Authority during the military phase of the liberation. During this period (which 
ended in July 1945) the Russians consulted with the British and the Americans, 
but not with the Dutch government (Bossenbroek 2001, 120). This resulted in 
the repatriation agreements of Yalta and Halle. At the Conference of Yalta in 
February 1945, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union agreed upon the principle of repatriating all respective displaced 
citizens on the stately basis of reciprocity – without offering them free choice 
(Tolstoy 1977, 19-20). 
Another reason the Soviet Union was in no hurry to reach a separate repatri-
ation agreement with the Dutch was that van Os van Delden had already begun 
repatriating Soviet citizens from the liberated southern part of the Netherlands 
in November 1944 on behalf of the Military Authority – without informing the 
Dutch government in London or Ambassador Van Breugel Douglas. Between 
November 1944 and December 1945, as many as 9,500 Soviet citizens and 
4,600 Soviet soldiers were repatriated from the Netherlands (Postma 2003, 
193). If Van Breugel Douglas had been informed, he could have potentially 
used this in his negotiations with Molotov, thus increasing the pressure on the 
Russians to come to a repatriation agreement.  
Despite the problems, the Dutch government was not completely dissatisfied 
with the repatriation from the Soviet Union during this period. Between March 
and June 1945, approximately 1,200 displaced Dutch civilians, refugees, 
Waffen-SS members, and POWs traveled from the harbor of Odessa in Ukraine 
to the Netherlands with the assistance of the British. After the German capitula-
tion, an exchange of displaced Western and Russian citizens took place along 
the demarcation line in Central Germany. Thanks to the efforts of the missions 
led by Boon and Willems, small groups of Dutch DPs were regularly returned 
from the Russian zone (Bossenbroek 2001, 124-5). 
Many of these returning Dutchmen took their Russian wives with them to 
the Netherlands.11 However, the Soviet Union wanted all of its citizens re-
turned, including these women, so it established a military Soviet repatriation 
mission in the Netherlands as part of SHAEF. The Russian repatriation officers 
exerted pressure on Russians living in the Netherlands who did not want to 
return to the Soviet zone by intimidating them, using violence, and even kid-
napping people (Burgers 2004, 130; van der Linden 2013 13). These Russian 
activities in the Netherlands aroused increasing public outrage, which was 
reflected in Dutch politics. By this time the Dutch government had taken over 
SHAEF’s responsibilities and was completely autonomous. In response to 
public outrage, the government progressively restricted the repatriation offic-
 
11  The historian Postma (2003, 174) estimated their number between 4,000 and 5,000. 
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ers’ freedom of movement. The silent pragmatism of Van Os van Delden, 
which so perfectly fitted the Russian repatriation strategy of reciprocity, gradu-
ally disappeared from Dutch policy. Instead, Russian citizens living in the 
Netherlands were only repatriated on a voluntary basis. Naturally, this angered 
the Russian government (Bossenbroek 2001, 126). The return of displaced 
Dutch citizens from the Soviet Union ended abruptly in May 1946. The Soviet 
government claimed it had arranged for the repatriation of 35,681 Dutch DPs 
up to this point, but now it ceased its cooperation.12 An explanation followed a 
few weeks later in which it was stated that, according to an aide-memoire, The 
Hague had failed to cooperate in the repatriation of Russian citizens and thus, 
in response, the Soviet Union had decided to suspend the repatriation of Dutch 
citizens (Postma 2003, 360). 
The arrival of 350 Mennonites from Ukraine in the Netherlands – awaiting 
emigration to Canada – in July 1946 worsened the diplomatic relationship 
between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union. The NRC expressed concern 
that this group of women and orphans had minimal prospects in the Soviet 
Union. The Dutch government shared this concern, and therefore approved of 
the temporary presence of the Mennonites in the Netherlands. The Russian 
ambassador to The Hague was furious, informing Moscow that the Dutch gov-
ernment was sabotaging the repatriation of Soviet nationals (Postma 2003, 
360). 
3.3  Dutch POWs in Soviet Gulags 
What exactly were the circumstances in which these missing persons (mostly 
POWs who had joined the Waffen-SS during the war) were living? Corre-
spondence between Dutch officials regarding repatriation, held in the archives 
of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shows that there was an enormous 
lack of information on Dutch DPs, and that this caused tremendous frustration 
among the officials involved.13 The Dutch authorities were completely in the 
dark about the number of Dutch citizens being held in the Soviet Union and the 
wider Soviet zone, because the Russian authorities refused to release infor-
mation on their Dutch hostages.14 One of the reasons for the creation of the 
MtO was to improve this situation.15  
 
12  Exchange of notes in Moscow and The Hague on the repatriation of Dutch citizens from the 
Soviet Union and Soviet citizens from the Netherlands, 2.05.111/165, National Archive The 
Hague. 
13  Exchange of notes in Moscow and The Hague on the repatriation of Dutch citizens from the 
Soviet Union and Soviet citizens from the Netherlands, 2.05.111/164, 165, National Archive 
The Hague. 
14  Van Bosch Drakestein to Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, August 2, 1946, 2.15.43/164, 
National Archive The Hague. 
15  Monthly report no. 1, MtO, August 14, 1947, 2.15.43/282, National Archive The Hague. 
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Since Dutch repatriation officers were now no longer allowed behind Soviet 
lines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to gather as much information as 
possible from Western Europeans returning from the Soviet Gulags. In addition 
to information on Dutch POWs still residing in Russia, these investigations also 
yielded information on those who had perished during their internment. All of 
the parties within the MtO exchanged this information in order to gain a better 
overview of the situation of the Dutch DPs (Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, eindverslag 1952). For example, in May 1945, the German military 
Officer Heinz Ebner was made a POW in Austria, where he was held in several 
Russian camps. When Ebner was released in 1950, he was repatriated via Brus-
sels, where an official of the Dutch embassy questioned him about the number 
of Dutch citizens in the Soviet camps and their living conditions. The first 
camp in which Ebner stayed was in Potsmar, about 600 kilometers south of 
Moscow. There were about 150 Dutchmen being held in this camp, most of 
them former members of the Waffen-SS. According to Ebner and reports by 
repatriated Dutch prisoners, these displaced Dutch citizens were transferred to 
Kharkov in January 1947, and then to Kiev in May 1949. During Ebner’s in-
ternment there, some Dutch POWs were sentenced to 10-20 years of forced 
labor. They were exiled to Siberia in December 1949 because they had com-
plained about their treatment, although their formal charges related only to their 
activities during the war. The head of the MtO forwarded this information to 
the Information Bureau in The Hague.16 Former POWs from Belgium also 
mentioned these trials after their release. They explained that only prisoners 
who for some reason stood out were subjected to this procedure. Following 
their conviction, they were transferred to other camps as civilian forced labor-
ers, together with Russian POWs.17 According to the NRC, many of the Dutch 
citizens in the camp at Kiev were forced to work as bricklayers, laboring ten to 
twelve hours a day. Their diet was limited, consisting of 600 grams of bread 
daily, half a liter of thin soup, 250 grams of oats at noon, and half a liter of 
soup in the evening. The treatment of the prisoners was dependent on the tem-
perament of the guards, but in general physical violence was not common.18 
3.4  Dutch Efforts to End the Impasse 
Despite the terrible circumstances that the Dutch DPs faced in the Russian 
camps, the Dutch government never gave in to the Russian government’s re-
 
16  Beelaerts van Blokland to minister of Foreign Affairs Stikker about the interned Dutchmen 
in Russia. Questioning was done by Mr. Zijlmans of the Dutch embassy in Brussels. April 17 
1950, Archive NRC/5.  
17  Report on the repatriation of Soviet citizens, as well as reciprocity of Dutch people living in 
the Soviet Union, 1950, 2.05.111/165, National Archives, The Hague. 
18  Beelaerts van Blokland to Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Stikker about the interned 
Dutchmen in Russia, April 17, 1950, Archive NRC/5. 
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quest for the forced repatriation of its own citizens. However, during the spring 
of 1947, the Dutch government, diplomats, and officials did attempt to come up 
with a solution to the impasse. In April 1947, the new Dutch ambassador to 
Moscow, Tony Lovink, proposed a breakthrough plan to the Soviet diplomat, 
Yakov Malik. Lovink explained to Malik that the Dutch government was will-
ing to inform all Soviet citizens living in the Netherlands of the Soviet gov-
ernment’s wishes regarding repatriation. He suggested that the Netherlands 
could enable meetings between these Russian citizens and Russian repatriation 
officials, and that the Dutch government could allow Russians to travel freely 
to the Russian embassy in The Hague and to the Soviet Union. He did not, 
however, capitulate to the Russian desire for the involuntary repatriation of 
Russian citizens. He stated that the Dutch government hoped that the Russians 
would accept these terms and measures, and that repatriation based on the 
principle of reciprocity would resume.19 In June of that year, the Dutch gov-
ernment made Lovink’s proposal official.20 
To the Dutch government’s great disappointment, the Russian response to 
this proposal was a resounding “njet” (no).The Soviet Union insisted upon the 
return of all Soviet citizens. As a result, the atmosphere concerning repatriation 
became even more strained and the tension between the two countries in-
creased. This tension was reflected in the Russian media, with Soviet politi-
cians and diplomats criticizing the Dutch for hindering Soviet repatriation and 
accusing the Dutch government of incarcerating Soviet citizens, preventing 
their repatriation, and spreading anti-Soviet propaganda among Russians in the 
Netherlands.21 Following Lovink’s proposal, such accusations increased.  
Until June 1948, there was an impasse – Lovink’s proposal had failed, and 
neither side wanted to give in. Then the Soviet ambassador to The Hague, 
Vasili Valkov, suddenly promised to accept the proposal. Valkov stated that the 
Soviet government would now follow the principle of reciprocity, and that it 
would consent to the return of Dutch DPs. The Russian promise felt like a 
victory for the Dutch, who now had to begin executing their own promises to 
fully cooperate with the repatriation of Soviet citizens. However, in August 
1948, a difference of opinion about the execution of the Dutch measures once 
again caused serious difficulties between the Russians and the Dutch.22 
The increasing distrust between East and West during the Cold War was re-
flected in these Dutch-Soviet negotiations about repatriation. According to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch government was not making 
 
19  Aide memoire Lovink, April 10, 1947, 2.05.111/ 164, National Archive The Hague. 
20  Verbal communication from Dutch embassy Moscow to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moscow, 
June 21, 1947, 2.05.111/164, National Archive The Hague. 
21  Letter from Dutch embassy Moscow to Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, July 11, 1946, 
2.05.111/164, National Archive The Hague. 
22  Letter of Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague to temporary agent in Moscow, A. Janzen, 
August 25, 1948, 2.05.111/197, National Archive The Hague. 
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enough effort to repatriate Soviet citizens. In response, the Soviet Union want-
ed to stall their own activities repatriating Dutch citizens until the Dutch made 
a more concerted effort.23 The Dutch interpretation of the principle of reciproci-
ty was that repatriation and preparations by both parties would run parallel. So, 
the Dutch responded by temporarily postponing the publication of the Russian 
government’s call to all Soviet citizens in the Netherlands to return home. They 
demanded a written explanation from the Kremlin about Russian arrangements 
for the repatriation of Dutch citizens before taking any action, however, the 
written explanation never came (Postma 2003, 313-4). 
From August 1948 to July 1949, 14 Soviet citizens were repatriated with 
Dutch cooperation. In the same period, only two Dutch citizens were returned, 
illustrating the lack of any numerical reciprocity. The Russian authorities as-
sumed (based on false information they had received from Ambassador 
Valkov) that at least 2,000 Russians were still present in the Netherlands. Alt-
hough the Dutch government did publish the Russian call to all Soviet citizens 
in Dutch newspapers, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that the Neth-
erlands had not fulfilled its obligation to cooperate in the Russian repatriation. 
In 1948, a new Dutch ambassador, Philip Christiaan Visser, was appointed to 
Moscow. Visser was convinced that the Russians would comply, and that the 
repatriation of Dutch citizens would begin shortly. He based this belief on 
discussions he had with high-ranking individuals within the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. However, due to a number of other incidents, Visser’s credi-
bility was already in question, and several Dutch officials believed that “the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs [had] simply fooled Mr. Visser” (Postma 
2003, 314). 
Because the Dutch government had no faith in the Russian promise to repat-
riate Dutch citizens, it considered revoking the measures they had already taken 
to encourage the repatriation of Soviet citizens. However, this would only give 
the Russians a stronger argument against returning Dutch DPs. The Dutch 
government did not know how to pursue a decisive policy without losing face. 
The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker, decided to write a fiercely 
worded letter to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he accused the 
Soviet ambassador, Valkov, of incorrect reporting. The 2,000 Soviet citizens 
who, according to Valkov, were still living in the Netherlands had already been 
repatriated, and the remaining Russians could only repatriate voluntarily. Thus, 
he stated, the role of the Netherlands in the Russian repatriation was com-
plete.24 A little over a month later, the head of the West European department 
of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Vinogradov, informed the 
 
23  Exchange of notes in Moscow and The Hague on the repatriation of Dutch from the Soviet 
Union and Soviet citizens from the Netherlands, 2.05.111/165, National Archive The Hague. 
24  Nota Dutch embassy Moscow to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Soviet Union, October 28, 1949, 
2.05.111/197, National Archive The Hague. 
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Dutch government that Valkov had indeed misinformed the Russian authori-
ties, and he was subsequently released from office. Although Vinogradov em-
phasized that the Soviet government did not require Soviet citizens to be re-
turned against their will, the Dutch DPs were still not returned.25 
By the summer of 1950, the Dutch government estimated that the number of 
Dutch citizens remaining in the Soviet Union was approximately 430. In Sep-
tember of that year, the new Dutch ambassador to Moscow, F. C. A. van Pal-
landt, had a conversation with the First Deputy Minister of the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Andrej Gromyko, hoping he could revitalize the repatriation 
issue. However, much to his disappointment, his initiative bore no fruit, and he 
returned from the negotiation discouraged. In a memorandum dated October 
12, 1950, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled a report of all the 
cooperative efforts that had been made with regard to the Soviet repatriation 
effort. Although the memorandum was little more than a reiteration of all the 
notes, letters, and demarches that had been sent to the Soviet Ministry of For-
eign Affairs between 1945 and 1950, it proved decisive, restarting the repatria-
tion of displaced Dutch citizens (Postma 2003, 317). Between the winter of 
1950 and the summer of 1952, approximately 250 citizens left the Soviet Un-
ion. This still left dozens of Dutch people in camps and prisons who had been 
convicted by the Soviet Union for crimes committed during the war. The Sovi-
et authorities refused repeated requests from the Dutch embassy in Moscow to 
give these prisoners the opportunity to contact the embassy or their families 
back in the Netherlands. It took until 1957 before (almost) all Dutch citizens 
held by the Soviet Union had returned (Postma 2003, 259). The exact reasoning 
behind their release remains unclear. One possibility is that the Russians simply 
felt that they had extracted as many Russian citizens from the Dutch govern-
ment as possible, as there had been no progress during the last four years, and 
as such, it was thus no longer beneficial to keep the Dutch citizens imprisoned.  
4.  Conclusion 
Despite the early awareness of the future responsibility to bring home Dutch 
citizens from the defeated Third Reich, the planning, preparation, and practices 
of the repatriation by the Dutch government in exile proved inadequate. Even 
though eventually, this task was left largely to SHAEF and UNRRA, this does 
not alter the fact that the controversy within the government was a primary 
contributory factor that led to the chaotic repatriation. The compromises 
reached between the two repatriation policies were simply unrealistic. Other 
 
25  Telegram Ambassador Visser to Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, December 28, 1949, 
2.05.111/197, National Archive The Hague. 
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factors included the coincidence of the general liberation of the Netherlands 
and the repatriation, and the overall chaotic situation during the collapse of the 
Third Reich. The repatriation activities of SHAEF and UNRRA were of sec-
ondary importance to the defeat of the German forces. As for the NRC, its 
ambitions were larger than the actual resources it had at its disposal – or that 
were made available to it. In addition, the NRC was heavily involved in relief 
activities for the western part of the country, which was given priority. Howev-
er, even when this phase was over, the NRC was still not always able to pro-
vide the tracing missions it oversaw with either the necessary equipment or the 
trained staff required. It is clear that the NRC’s ambitions did not fit the reality 
of the repatriation conditions. In addition, the Dutch government did little to 
nothing to lend support to the NRC’s repatriation efforts, and even thwarted 
them with financial cutbacks. The result was disappointment among early 
repatriates and the families of those who stayed behind. The criticism that 
swept the country in the early months following the liberation remains to this 
day – especially among the Jewish community and former resistance workers 
and their children and grandchildren (Grüter 2010, 402, 409–10).  
As for the repatriation from the Soviet Union, this episode stands out. Many 
DPs were able to return in the early months after the collapse of the Third 
Reich, but as time went on and the Cold War intensified, repatriation became a 
political issue. The Dutch government did not reach a repatriation agreement 
with the Soviet Union, nor did it give in to the Soviet demand to repatriate 
Soviet citizens on Dutch territory against their will. This only served to further 
intensify the controversy between the Dutch and the Soviet governments. 
Eventually the matter subsided, and most of the surviving Dutch DPs had re-
turned by the mid-1950s, by which time the repatriation of Dutch DPs was 
considered closed. 
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